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Characterization of inequality changes through microeconometric 
decomposition  
 
Paraguay 1992 – 2005 
 
3.1 Introduction   
 
The main economic variables have oscillated widely during the 1992 – 2005 
period in Paraguay, in association with some macroeconomic and structural 
transformations, but also following general growth trends and business cycles in 
the South American region. This can be separated into three sub-periods; 1992 
to 1998, 1999 to 2002 and 2003 to 2005. 
 
During the early eighties, the Paraguayan economy benefited from high public 
investment rates resulting from the construction of the Itaipu and Yacyreta 
hydro-electric power plants. The country made its own way of stability and 
growth during a period of hyperinflations and external debt crisis in many South 
American countries. Nevertheless, its economy fell into a growth crisis (still 
avoiding debt crisis and hyperinflation) during the second half of the eighties, 
once the construction period of the hydroelectric power plants came to an end. 
During the first half of the nineties, Paraguayan economy recovered from 
recession, now driven by agricultural production and a re-export business boom, 
based on special arrangements for duty rates for electric and electronic 
equipment imported to the MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur - regional 
free trade agreement established in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay) region via Paraguay. The agricultural success was based on a recovery 
of international cotton prices, combined with a successful cotton extension 
program for small farmers within the country and a quick and widespread 
expansion of mechanized soybean farming. The commercial success with 
electric and electronic components was based on re-export. Paraguayan import 
duty rates from outside MERCOSUR were so low, that Brazilian and Argentine 
enterprises would prefer to buy these products re-exported from Paraguay, rather 
than importing themselves from outside MERCOSUR, which would have meant 
higher duty rates. Before this background, Paraguayan GDP per capita grew 
until 1995 and then remained relatively stable until 1998. The per capita income
1 
Gini coefficient fell from 55.8 to 54.0. Mean per capita growth was 0.63% and 
poverty dropped from 38.2% to 32.1%. 
                                                 
1   Including all kinds of income, labour income, non-labour income and imputed 
values for own housing. 
1The period between 1999 and 2002 saw great political instability. Weak and 
unconcluded structural reform processes in the economy, which had begun in the 
nineties, were terminated. Small-scale cotton farming entered a deep crisis due 
to falling international prices and considerable parasite problems, combined with 
adverse climatic conditions (El Niño phenomenon), affecting agriculture in 
general. External shocks such as the Brazilian devaluation during global finance 
crisis and the Argentine default strongly hit the country. Per capita growth was -
2.6% and poverty leaped to more than 46%. Gini coefficient for income 
inequality ascended to 56.1. As from 2003, political changes brought the country 
back to a more stable course. A tax reform and institutional improvements in 
Government provided more and new revenues to the treasury. Public 
expenditure, including social expenditure went up. Economy was benefited by a 
regional recovery. In the production sector, this period is marked by an 
important growth of livestock and meat exports. Per capita GDP grew 2.0% on 
average, while poverty went down to 38.2% and Gini coefficient to 52.8. 
 
However, the reasons behind these changes in inequality are more varied and 
complex than just a macroeconomic history could tell. The main purpose of this 
paper is to assess the relevance of some forces that are believed to have affected 
income inequality in Paraguay between 1992 and 2005. More specifically, the 
microeconometric decomposition methodology proposed by Bourguignon, 
Ferreira and Lustig (1998) has been used to measure the relevance of various 
factors, which appear to have driven changes in inequality. In particular, this 
methodology has been used to identify to what extent changes in the returns to 
education and experience, in the endowments of unobservable factors (such as 
individual’s innate ability) and their returns, in the wage gap between men and 
women, in labour market participation and hours of work, and in the educational 
structure of the population contribute to explain the observed changes in income 
distribution.  
 
The results of this paper suggest that the smaller change in inequality between 
1992 and 1997/98 is mainly as a result of employment (including hours of work) 
and education effects, characterized by a primary schooling expansion. The 
larger inequality reduction effect after 1997 is due to returns to education, hours 
of work (since unemployment increased) and unobservable factors. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
decomposition methodology implemented to assess the relevance of those 
factors. Section 3 shows the basic facts and discusses some factors that may 
have affected inequality during the last two decades, while section 4 explains the 
estimation strategy. The main results of the analysis are presented in section 5. 
The paper concludes with some brief final comments in section 6.  
2 
3.2 Methodology   
 
Many different forces exist behind the long-run changes in income distributions 
or, more generally, distributions of economic welfare, within a population. Some 
of these forces have to do with changes in the distribution of factor endowments 
and socio-demographic characteristics, while others have to do with the returns 
these endowments produce and others with changes in populations’ behaviour 
such as labour supply, consumption patterns or the decision on whether or not to 
have children. These forces are not independent from each other. This is what 
makes it difficult to precisely identify fundamental causes and mechanisms 
behind the dynamics of income distribution. Decomposition techniques are used 
to identify causes of distributional changes. Traditional techniques explain 
differences in scalar summary measures of distributions rather than in full 
distributions. The best known of these techniques is the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of differences in mean incomes across population groups with 
different characteristics (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) and the variance-like 
decomposition property of the so-called decomposable summary inequality 
measures (Bourguignon 1979; Cowell 1980; Shorocks 1980). In both cases, the 
underlying logic is that the aggregate mean income (or inequality measure) in a 
population is the result of the aggregation of various socio-demographic groups 
of income sources. Thus, changes of overall mean or inequality measure can be 
explained by identifying changes in the means and inequality measures within 
those groups or income sources, and in their weights in the population or in total 
income. 
 
The new focus on poverty and inequality reduction, which increasingly drives 
development policy, currently requires new analysis techniques on the shape of 
distribution, for example, in the vicinity of and below the poverty line. In terms 
of the Oaxaca-Blinder approach, the issue is to know not so much whether mean 
earnings are lower for women then for men, since the former may have less 
average education, as whether the differences are greater or smaller for the 
bottom part of the earnings distribution. Answering this kind of questions 
requires handling the whole distribution rather than summary measures. To 
assess the relevance of the various factors on income inequality changes, 
handling whole distributions, a microeconometric decomposition methodology 
first proposed by Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998) was tailored to the 
Paraguayan case.
2 
                                                 
2   Variants of the basic methodology have been applied in Altimir, Beccaria and 
González Rozada (2000), Bourguignon, Gurgand and Fournier (1999), Bouillon, 
Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa (2000), Legovini and Lustig (1998) and Ferreira 
and Paes de Barros (1999), amongst others.  
 
3 
The basic model 
The decomposition of a distributional change essentially consists of contrasting 
representations of the income-generation process (evaluating differences in 
estimated parameters) for two different distributions (two points in time) on the 
one hand, and accounting for changes in the joint distribution of endowments, on 
the other. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998) use parametric representation 
of inequality changes, because the parameters lead themselves directly to 
relevant economic interpretations. 
 
More formally, a parametric representation of an income generation process can 
be defined by a set of variables X = (V, W) where specific combinations of 
individual characteristics V and the values of these individual characteristics W 
are defining groups. A general parametric representation of the conditional 
functions  ) , ( W V y g
τ and  ) ( W V h
τ relates y and (V, W) on the one hand, and V and 
W on the other, according to some predetermined functional form. These 
relationships can be denoted as follows: 
 
] ; , , [ τ ε Ω = W V G y       (3.1) 
 
] ; , [ τ η Φ = W H V        (3.2) 
 
Where  τ Ω and  τ Φ  are sets of parameters and ε  and ηare random variables - η is 
a vector if V is a vector. These random variables play a similar role to the 
residual term in standard regressions. They are meant to represent the dispersion 
of income y or individual characteristics V for given values of individual 
characteristics (V,  W), and W, respectively. They are also assumed to be 
distributed independently of theses characteristics, according to density 
functions 
τ π and 
τ µ . The functions G and H have pre-imposed functional forms. 
 
If this model were to be applied to the distribution of individual earnings, the 
methodology would be rather simple. Ignoring the partition of X into exogenous 
characteristics (W) and non-exogenous individual characteristics (V), a simple 
parametric representation of individual earnings as a function of individual 
characteristics is given by: 
 
   Log ε
τ + Ω ⋅ = X yi        (3.3) 
In this particular case, the function of G( ) is thus as follows: 
  
ε ε
+ Ω ⋅ = Ω
X e X G ) ; , (        (3.4) 
To obtain estimates for the set of parameters Ω and for the distribution of the 
random termε , one may rely on standard econometric techniques. Running a 
4 





τ τ εi i i X y + Ω ⋅ =        (3.5) 
yields an estimate of the set of parameters  τ Ω , as well as of the distribution  τ π  
of the random term. Then, counterfactuals D can be computed easily. Without 
the (V, W) distinction, a counterfactual is defined as  ) ; , ( Ω π χ D , where  ) , ( η χ W  
is the joint distribution of the exogenous components of (V,  W). In discrete 
representation { ) ,.., , ( } 2 1 υ
τ
N i y y y y = of the distribution at timeτ , where  τ N  is 
the number of observations in the sample available at time  t t ′ = , τ , it is 








i t t t y D
′ →








i X y ε ˆ ˆ ) ( + Ω ⋅ = ′
′ →
Ω    for i= 1, 2, …,  t N    (3.7) 
 
where the notation ^ stands for OLS estimates. The counterfactual is thus 
obtained by simulating the preceding model on the sample of observations 
available at time t. This simulation shows what would have been the earnings of 
each individual of the sample if the returns to each of the observed 
characteristics had been those observed at time t′rather than the actual returns at 
time t. The returns to the unobservable characteristics that may be behind the 
residual term 
t
i ε ˆ  are supposed to be unchanged, nonetheless. This is equivalent 
to the evaluation of the price effect for observed characteristics of the Oaxaca-
Blinder calculation. The difference is that the evaluation is carried out for every 
individual in the sample. The counterfactual of the distribution of the random 
term 
t t
i t t t y D
′ →
Ω ′ = Ω } { ) , , ( π χ is a little more difficult to construct. Importing the 
distribution of residuals from time t′to time t requires an operation known as 
rank-preserving-transformation, whereby the residual in the 
th n percentile (of 
residuals) at time t is replaced by the residual in the 
th n percentile at time t′, for 
all n. As the operation is not immediate when the number of observations is not 
the same in the two samples, an approximate solution is used. It consists of 
assuming that both distributions of residual terms are the same up to a 
proportional transformation. An example would be if residuals were normally 
distributed, with mean zero. The rank-preserving-transformation is then 
equivalent to multiplying the residual observed at time t by the ratio of standard 
deviation at time t′and t. 
t t
i t t t y D
′ →
Ω ′ = Ω } { ) , , ( π χ is thus defined by: 
 






i X y ε ε π σ σ ε
′ ′ → ⋅ + Ω ⋅ =   for i= 1, 2, …,  t N  (3.8) 
 
5 
With those counterfactuals at hand, estimates for the contribution to the 
observed overall distributional change between t and t′of the change in the Ω 
parameters, in the distribution of residuals (π ), and possibly even of these two 
changes taken together, may easily be found. The effect of changing the 
distribution of individual endowments, X, is obtained as the complement of the 
two previous changes: 
 
). , , ( } { t t t
t
i D y ′ ′
′ Ω − π χ        (3.9) 
 
Adaptation to Paraguayan data 
Let Yit be individual’s i labour income at time t, which can be written as a 
function F of the vector Xit of individual observable characteristics affecting 
wages and employment, the vector eit of unobservable characteristics, the vector 
bt  of parameters that determine market hourly wages and the vector lt  of 
parameters that affect employment outcomes (participation and hours of work).  
 
    Yit = F(Xit ,εit , βt , λt ) i=1, ..., N       (3.10) 
   
The distribution of individual labour income can be represented as:  
 
    Dt ={Y1t , ..., YNt }       
  (3.11)  
   
We can simulate individual labour incomes by changing one or more arguments 
in equation (3.10). For instance, the following expression represents labour 
income that individual’s i would have earned in time t if the parameters 
determining wages had been those of time t’, keeping all other things constant.  
 
    Yit (βt’ ') = F (Xit , εit , βt’', λt ) i=1, ..., N       (3.12) 
   
More generally, we can define Yit(kt’) where k is any set of arguments in (3.10). 
Hence, the simulated distribution will be:  
 
    Dt (kt ') ={Yt (kt ' ), ..., YNt (kt ') }      ( 3 . 1 3 )  
 
The contribution to the overall change in the distribution of a change in k 
between t and t‘, holding all else constant, can be obtained by comparing (3.11) 
and (3.13). Although we can make the comparisons in terms of the whole 
distributions, in this paper we only compare inequality indices I(D). Therefore, 
the effect of a change in argument k is defined by: 
 
6 
    I[(Dt (kt ')] -I (Dt) 
3      ( 3 . 1 4 )  
This paper is devoted to discuss the following effects:  
•  Returns to education ( k = β
ed
) measures the effect of changes in the 
parameters that relate education to hourly wages (β
ed
) on inequality.  
•  Gender wage gap (k = β
g
) measures the effect of changes in the 
parameters that relate gender to hourly wages (β
g
) on inequality.  
•  Returns to experience ( k = β
ex
) measures the effect of changes in the 




•  Endowment and returns to unobservable factors ( k=e
w
) measures the 
effect of changes in the unobservable factors and their remunerations 
affecting hourly wages (e
w
) on inequality.  
•  Hours of work and employment (k = λ) measures the effect of changes in 
the parameters that determine hours of work and labour market 
participation (λ) on inequality.  
•  Education  (k = X
ed
) measures the effect of changes in the educational 
levels of the population (X
ed
) on inequality.  
 
The previous discussion refers to the distribution of individual earnings. 
However, it is more relevant from a social point of view to study the distribution 
of household income since a person’s utility usually depends not on their own 
earnings, but on their household income and demographic composition. 















iht a Y Y Y / ) (
0
     i = 1, …, N  (3.15) 
 
where Y
q stands for equivalent household income, h is the household, Y
0 is the 
income from other sources, a is the equivalent adult and q captures household 
economies of scale. The distribution of equivalent household income can be 
expressed as:  
 
  Dt ={Y
q
1t , ..., Y
q
Nt }        ( 3 . 1 6 )  
 
Changing argument k to its value in t’ yields the following simulated equivalent 
household income in year t: 
 
Θ





jt t iht a Y k Y k Y    i = 1, …, N   (3.17) 




t (k t ') ={ Y
q
1t (kt '), ..., Y
q
Nt kt ')}     (3.18)
                                                 
3   In the empirical implementation labour income distribution only is computed 
for those individuals such that Yit > 0 and Yit(kt’) > 0. 
7 
The effect of a change in argument k, holding all else constant, on equivalent 






t (kt ')] -I (D
q
t) .        ( 3 . 1 9 )  
 
3.3  Income inequality in Paraguay: basic facts and sources of change 
 
Per capita income inequality in Paraguay during the nineties has a generally 
negative tendency, rising during economic and political crisis between 1999 and 
2002 and then recovering its path towards reduction. Figure 3.1 shows the Gini 
coefficient of per capita household income between 1992 and 2005 in Paraguay, 
combined with poverty headcount measures and GDP per capita.
5 Only since 
2001 is there a yearly update of poverty and inequality measures in Paraguay. 
 
Figure 3.1  Gini coefficient of Per Capita Household Income Distribution, 






























































Gini Poverty GDP per capita
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC for 
 poverty and inequality. GDP data from the Banco Central del Paraguay. 
For simplicity, this study focuses on three years of relative macroeconomic 
                                                 
4    In the empirical implementation we ignore income from other than labour 
sources Yjt
o
 and we consider all individuals such that  0 ≥
q
it Y  and  0 ) ( ≥ ′ t
q
it k Y .  
5   The 1992 survey was carried out by the Universidad Nacional de Asuncion, while 
the 1995 to 2005 surveys are Encuestas Permanentes de Hogares (EPH) or 
Encuestas Integrales de Hogares (EIH, only 1997/98 and 2000/01) carried out by 
the National Statistical Office (Direccion General de Estadistica, Encuestas y 
Censo - DGEEC). 
8 
stability separated by almost equal intervals: 1992, 1997/98 and 2005
6. The 
analysis was restricted to labour income mainly for two reasons. 
 
(i) Permanent 
Household Surveys (EPH) and Integrated Household Surveys (EIH) have 
various deficiencies in capturing capital income, and (ii) modelling capital 
income and retirement payments is not an easy task, especially considering the 
scarce information included in the surveys. Households whose heads or spouses 
are older than 64, or receive retirement payments, were ignored. The following 
analysis concentrates on the distribution of individual labour income
7 and on the 
distribution of equivalent
8 household labour income.  
 
Table 3.1  Income Distribution in Paraguay, Selected Years (Gini 
coefficient) 
Type of distribution  1992  1997/98  2005 
Labour income  0.589  0.553  0.490 
Equivalent household labour income  0.606  0.584  0.528 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the basic facts to be characterized in the paper: inequality in 
individual labour income and in equivalent household labour income, as 
measured by the Gini, dropped almost ten percentage points between 1992 and 
2005. Interestingly, labour income inequality reduction is stronger than 
equivalent household labour income reduction. Reduction between 1997/98 and 
2005 is much stronger than between 1992 and 1997/98, even if the first period 
contains a sub-period of economic, political and social crisis where inequality 
grew. One possible reason for the stronger decrease of inequality in labour 
income, compared with inequality in household income, may lie in changes in 
non-labour income sources. Main non-labour income sources in Paraguayan 
income survey measures are the imputed value on own housing and transfers 
from family members inside and outside the country. Mainly the poor are 
benefited from imputed values for own housing, no matter how precarious their 
housing might be. There is an underdeveloped market for renting houses or 
apartments. It is nearly exclusively an urban phenomenon, restricted to rich 
                                                 
6   1992 and 1995 surveys report income for September, EIH 1997/98 for February of 
1998, 1999 for September, 2000/01 for March 2001 and starting from 2002 all 
incomes for November. 
7   Labour income comprises wage earnings and self-employed earnings. 
8   Following Buhmann et al. (1988) the equivalent household income is obtained by 
dividing household income by the number of equivalent adults raised to 0.8, a 
parameter which implies mild household economies of scale. Since there is no 
official measurement of equivalent adult scales from DGEEC in Paraguay, general 
scales with 0.4 for children < 5 years of age, 0.5 for children > 5 years of age, and 
< 16 years of age and 1.0 for all individuals > 14 years of age were applied. 
9 
households that can afford to pay rent. Cash transfer from private sector to 
Paraguayan households came mainly from Argentina during the nineties and 
since 2003 with an increasing degree from Spain and the US. Private sector cash 
transfers are distributed all over society, from very poor to very rich. In 1992 
private cash transfers were 1.8% of total household income, 4.3% in 1997/98 
and 4.7% in 2005. Other possible sources for differences in changes between 
labour and household income are changes in marriage markets or changes in 
household composition (total number of individuals per household). Regression 
results in the next chapter will give some hints on these points. There are almost 
no public cash transfers, apart from very small pension payments, but pension 
recipients were excluded from the analysis by definition. An innumerable 
number of factors may have caused the changes in inequality documented in 
Table 3.1. We will concentrate on seven of these: (i) returns to education, (ii) the 
gender wage gap,
9 (iii) returns to experience, (iv) the dispersion in the 
endowment of unobservable factors and their returns, (v) hours of work, (vi) 
labour market participation, and (vii) the education of the working-able 
population.  
 
3.3.1  Returns to education  
 
An increase in the returns to education implies a widening of the wage gap 
between high and low educated workers, which in turn would imply a more 
unequal distribution of individual earnings and probably a more unequal 
distribution of household income. Table 3.2 shows hourly earnings in constant 
Guaranies (Gs.) in 2005 for workers between 12 and 64 with valid and complete 
answers. The average wage increased 5.3% between 1992 and 1997/98 and 
dropped 7.8% during the next seven years. Changes were not consistent among 
educational groups. In the first period of the analysis we had winners and losers. 
While incomes for workers who had not finished primary education increased 
slightly, the wages for the next two groups, complete primary education and 
incomplete secondary education, dropped considerably. Dramatic increases were 
observed for complete secondary and complete or incomplete college education. 
In the 1997/98 – 2005 period the losses of income were generalized for all 
income groups except for primary incomplete education. Losses for higher 
education are stronger than for lower education. Table 3.2 is a first piece of 
evidence that changes in relative wages among schooling groups implied an 
increase in earnings inequality between 1992 and 1997/98 and a decrease 
thereafter.  
                                                 
9   Throughout this paper “wage” refers to hourly labour income earned by wage-
workers and self-employed workers. 
10 
Table 3.2  Hourly Earnings by Educational Level in Paraguay, Selected 
Years 
  Means (Gs. 2005)  Changes (percent) 
Educational  Level  1992 1997/98 2005 1992-1998 1998-2005  1992-2005
Primary  incomplete  3,000.6 3,131.7 3,207.5  4.4  2.4  6.9 
Primary  complete  4,635.7 4,276.3 3,547.7  -7.8  -17.0  -23.5 
Secondary  incopl.  6,035.0 5,477.5 3,998.4  -9.2  -27.0  -33.7 
Secondary complete  8,145.8  10,226.9 6,525.8  25.5  -36.2  -19.9 
College incomplete  11,763.0  16,081.3 10,040.8 36.7  -37.6  -14.6 
College complete  20,957.6  28,811.8 18,594.8 37.5  -35.5  -11.3 
Total  5,746.9 6,051.1 5,580.1  5.3  -7.8  -2.9 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the results of Mincerian log hourly earning functions estimated 
using the Heckman procedure to correct for sample selection. The first three 
columns refer to household heads (mostly men) and the rest to spouses (nearly 
all women) and other members of the family (roughly half men and half 
women), respectively. A gender dummy, age and age squared and a dummy for 
youngsters less than 18 years old (only relevant for other members) are included 
in the regression. In addition to these variables, the selection equation includes 
marital status, number of children and a dummy that takes the value “1” when 
the individual attends school. Following Bourguignon et al. (1999) it is assumed 
that labour market participation choices are made within the household in a 
sequential fashion. Spouses take the head’s labour market status into 
consideration to decide whether to enter the labour market or not. Other 
members of the family consider both the head and the spouse labour market 
status.  
 
The coefficients for years of education are positive and returns to education are 
always positive. For family heads in 1992, one additional year of schooling 
increases in the mean hourly wages in 11.3%, keeping all other factors constant. 
The same figure for 1997/98 and 2005 is 15.4% and 10.9%, respectively. It is 
interesting to observe that spouses hourly wage determination follows the same 
path of the heads hourly wage. It also increases (from 7.5% to 13.2%) between 
1992 and 1997/98 and then drops again (to 10.7%) in 2005, but there is no such 
path for other family members who lose income in each period. Figure 3.2 
shows the predicted hourly earnings for all different years of education. The first 
panel refers to male heads and the second to other male members, both with age 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.2   Hourly Earnings-Education Profiles for Men (Heads of 
Household and Other Family Members), Age 40 





































Source: Predicted hourly earnings from models on table 3.3. 
 









































Source: Predicted hourly earnings from models on table 3.3. 
 
The wage-education profiles for family heads have a marked positive slope and 
are almost parallel everywhere, except for the substantial increase in the slope of 
1997/98 in the highest levels, as from 13 years of education. This certainly 
contributes to increase earnings inequality among household heads with 
different educational levels. For male other-members the wage-education profile 
we have almost parallel slopes for all periods with some differences only for 17 
and 18 years of education. So the changes in earnings of other family members 
could contribute only for high levels to widen inequality. 
14 











































Source: Predicted hourly earnings from models on table 3.3. 
Figure 3.3 shows the profiles for 40 year old females. As in the case for men, the 
wage-education profiles show an increasing slope between 1992 and 1997/98, 
and an opposite movement between 1997/98 and 2005.  It is interesting to see 
that for all three groups (household heads, spouses and other family members) 
there is a strong increase in returns for higher education in the 1992 – 1997/98 
period. This is a real observation and unbiased by model specification, since 
years of education did not enter the model in its squared from. The reason for 
high returns for higher education might lie in pure market effects. Even if the 
Paraguayan economy and its industry are not very sophisticated, there is still a 
need for highly qualified human resources in any managerial post. As Table 3.10 
will show further ahead, the percentage of the working force which completed 
college education did not exceed 2.4% over the whole observation period. 
Incomplete college education increased from 4.6% in 1992 to 9.4% in 2005, but 
nevertheless, these levels still remain low, and in a way, can explain why 2005 
return profiles are much “smoother” than in previous years. 
 
Summarizing, there is evidence of a positive relationship between hourly 
earnings and education which induces differences in incomes among individuals 
with different education. According to the evidence presented these differences, 
along with inequality, have increased between 1992 and 1997/98, and decreased 
in the next seven years. During this last period the wage-education profile has 
become smoother and less convex, which implies inequality reduction. Although 
this phenomenon seems widespread across groups, it appears to be more relevant 
for the groups of household heads and spouses.  
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3.3.2  Gender wage gap  
 
Table 3.4 presents mean hourly wages by gender. Wages were higher for males 
in every year. Nevertheless, there are interesting dynamics within the gender 
wage gap which decreased from more than 16% in 1992 to less than 2% in 
1997/98, and then increased again to some 6% in 2005. Over the whole period, 
female mean wage gain was about 6.9%, while male wages increased only in 
0.6%. This implies inequality reduction over the whole observation period. 
 
Table 3.4  Hourly Earnings by Gender in Paraguay, Selected Years 
   Means (Gs. 2005)  Changes (percent) 
Gender 1992  1997/98 2005 1992-1997/98  1997/98-2005  1992-2005
Female 5,679 7,390  6,072  30.1  -17.8  6.9 
Male 6,443  7,472  6,484  16.0  -13.2  0.6 
Total 6,046  7,411  6,318  22.6  -14.8  4.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
A conditional analysis also shows a shrinking gap for household heads. From 
Table 3.3 the coefficient for the male dummy is not always positive and 
significant, but clearly decreasing over time. Surprisingly, for other members we 
observe an important male income loss in 1997/98. However, since the number 
of working individuals in this group is considerably less than in the household 
heads group, the global conclusion of a narrowing gender wage gap holds. This 
shrinking gap has undoubtedly been an equalizing factor on the individual 
earnings distribution. The effect of this phenomenon on the equivalent 
household labour income distribution will basically depend on the position of 
working women in that distribution. Section 5 will expand on this further ahead.  
 
3.3.3  Returns to experience  
 
Age is used in this paper as a proxy for experience in the labour market. Table 
3.5 shows average hourly earnings for different age groups. In general the wage-
age profile has an inverted U shape. Between 1992 and 2005, hourly wages only 
increased for labour force younger than 30 years of age, which is the worst paid 
group of workers. In principle, this would imply an equalizing effect on the 
earnings distribution. However, the main benefit is for men and women less than 
20 years of age. In 1992 they represented less than 13% of the total working 
population. During the 1997/98 to 2005 period these gains were lost again. All 
age groups lost income considerably in the 1997/98 to 2005 period, with a 
stronger loss for young workers. Once more, since this group is small, its effect 
is not big on the overall distribution. Since all other age groups lost more or less 
similar percentages of their wage there seems to be only a very small, but in the 
end positive equalizing effect. 
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Table 3.5  Hourly Earnings by Age Groups, Paraguay, Selected Years 
  Means (Gs. 2005)  Changes (percent) 
Age 1992  1997/98  2005  1992-1997/98  1997/98-2005  1992-2005
12 to 19  2,726  3,431  2,019  25.9  -41.1  -25.9 
20 to 29  5,026  5,128  4,198  2.0  -18.1  -16.5 
30 to 39  6,671  6,096  4,942  -8.6  -18.9  -25.9 
40 to 49  6,769  5,943  4,818  -12.2  -18.9  -28.8 
50 to 59  6,940  6,034  4,652  -13.1  -22.9  -33.0 
60 to 64  6,155  5,351  4,381  -13.1  -18.1  -28.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
 
Throughout the whole observation period, the age group between 20 and 29 
years of age is the less affected one. This implies certain equalizing effects, 
since in 2005 this group represented almost 40% of the working force. More 
negatively affected groups are those for working force older than 40 years of 
age. Nevertheless, in 2005 all three of these groups together represented less 
than half of the working force (48%). Since their mean wages are lower than the 
mean wages of the largest age group (20 to 29), their inequality increasing 
effects should be lower than the equalizing effects of the 20 to 29 year old 
group. Summing up, there are some reasons to believe that changes in the 
returns to experience have led to higher inequality and some reasons to believe 
the opposite. The analysis of Section 5 will help us to assess the quantitative 
relevance of each argument.  
 
3.3.4  Unobservable factors  
 
Earnings equations allow the estimation of returns to observable factors like 
education and experience. The error term is usually interpreted as capturing the 
joint effect of the endowment of non-observable factors (like individual ability) 
and its market value on earnings. In general terms, the variance of this error term 
captures the contribution of dispersion in unobservable factors to general 
inequality. Table 3.3 reports the standard deviation of the error terms of each log 
hourly earnings equation (labelled as “sigma”). For instance, for household 
heads the standard deviation took a value of 0.86 in 1992, 1.01 in 1997/98, and 
0.89 in 2005. The substantial increase between 1992 and 1997/98 is also present 
in the spouses and other members’ equations, as well as the reduction towards 
2005. According to these results, the effect of changes in unobservable factors 
would have been strongly unequalizing between 1992 and 1997/98, reducing 






3.3.5  Hours of work  
 
During the period under analysis there has been an increase in weekly hours of 
work between 1992 and 1997/98 and a decrease in the next seven years, almost 
to the same overall level observed in 1992. Table 3.6 classifies workers by 
educational level and records the average hours of work of each group. While 
there are clear gains for completed cycles in the 1992 to 1997/98 period, which 
deepens inequality, losses in 1997/98 to 2005 are more equally distributed. So, 
over the whole period we still observe important gains for completed cycles of 
secondary and college education, but at the same time important losses for 
groups who did not complete an education cycle. Since gains are larger for 
higher educational groups, this change would have a non-negligible 
unequalizing effect in the individual earnings distribution. A conditional analysis 
yields similar results. Figure 3.4 shows predicted weekly hours of work for male 
heads from the Tobit censored data model presented in Table 3.7. While hours 
clearly increased between 1992 and 1997/98 for less-educated (1 to 6 years of 
education) and for well educated (more than 13 years of education) male heads 
workers, changes in hours for the rest of the educational groups were only 
marginal between 1992 and 1997/98. In the  
 
Table 3.6   Weekly Hours of Work by Educational Levels in Paraguay, 
Selected Years 
   Means  Changes (percent) 
Educational Level  1992  1997/98 2005 1992-1997/98 1997/98-2005 1992-2005
Primary  incomplete  47.9 51.0 45.4  6.0  -12.3  -5.5 
Primary  complete  50.3 51.3 49.3  2.0  -4.0  -1.9 
Secondary 
incomplete  50.1 51.9 49.6  3.4  -4.7  -1.1 
Secondary  complete  50.0 48.7 50.6  -2.6  3.8  1.2 
College  incomplete 45.5 46.5 44.8  2.2  -3.8  -1.5 
College  complete  45.6 48.1 48.0  5.2  -0.3  4.9 
Total  49.0 50.4 47.9  2.8  -5.2  -2.2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
18 
Figure 3.4   Weekly Hours of Work by Educational Level for Men (Heads of 































Source: Predicted hourly earnings from models on table 3.7. 
following seven years, the reduction of weekly hours of work is generalized for 
levels above six years of education. Consequently, we have evidence over the 
whole observation period for an equalizing effect for workers between 1 and 6 
years of education, an unequalizing effect for workers between 7 and 15 years of 
education and a nearly neutral effect for the highest education levels. 
 
3.3.6  Labour market participation  
 
Household income inequality can change, not only after changes in hours of 
work but also as a result of changes in labour market participation. In Table 3.7 
individuals are grouped according to whether they are employed, unemployed or 
inactive. The percentage of unemployed individuals dropped from 4.4% in 1992 
to 3.4% en 1997/98 and rose again to 3.8% in 2005. However, notice that the 
increase in unemployment between 1997/98 and 2005 in 0.4 percentage points 
was accompanied by a decrease in inactivity in 3.2 percentage points. Notice 
that for inequality measures it is irrelevant whether an individual has zero 
income as a result of unemployment or due to not looking for a job. Hence the 
important indicator for possible inequality changes is the overall employment 
rate which increased from 57% to 61% and 63% during the observation period. 
These changes might have played a role in inequality changes depending on the 
distribution of wage levels and hours of work obtained by the additional working 
force. 
19 
Table 3.7  Labour Status by Household Role, Paraguay, Selected Years 
   Proportions by group (percent)
   1992  1997/98  2005 
All          
Employed 56.96 60.55 63.36 
Unemployed 4.40  3.35  3.75 
Inactive 38.64  36.10  32.89 
Head          
Employed 89.75 88.73 87.11 
Unemployed 2.02  2.33  2.61 
Inactive 8.23  8.94  10.28 
Spouse          
Employed 23.80 47.38 57.10 
Unemployed 6.76  2.15  2.44 
Inactive 69.44  50.46  40.46 
Other          
Employed 41.92 49.84 51.93 
Unemployed 5.60  4.54  5.00 
Inactive 52.48  45.61  43.06 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
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Table 3.7 suggests three different stories in the labour market for heads, spouses 
and other members. Some household heads lost or quit their jobs, especially 
during the last seven years, becoming either unemployed or leaving the labour 
force. In contrast, many (30 percentage points) of the spouses left their homes in 
search of a job: most of them found one between 1992 and 1997/98, however, 
some did not during the 1997/98 to 2005 period. The other members of the 
family were less fortunate: even if the participation rate also increased 
dramatically (10 percentage points), their unemployment rate remained nearly 
unchanged, doubling spouses unemployment during the last period. 
 
Table 3.9  Labour Status and Education, Paraguay, Selected Years 
   Proportions by group (percent) 
   1992  1997/98  2005 
Primary incomplete      
Employed 47.09  55.55  61.54 
Unemployed 5.57  2.26  2.25 
Inactive 47.35  42.19  36.20 
Primary complete     
Employed 52.26  62.87  64.65 
Unemployed 5.59  2.82  3.22 
Inactive 42.16  34.31  32.13 
Secondary incomplete     
Employed 44.99  54.30  51.97 
Unemployed 4.21  4.72  4.34 
Inactive 50.80  40.98  43.70 
Secondary complete     
Employed 57.67  73.40  73.65 
Unemployed 4.28  5.45  6.61 
Inactive 38.04  21.15  19.75 
College incomplete     
Employed 65.76  82.53  79.31 
Unemployed 1.73  4.80  4.60 
Inactive 32.52  12.66  16.09 
College complete     
Employed 88.57  89.50  92.42 
Unemployed 1.71  1.66  2.89 
Inactive 9.71  8.84  4.69 
All      
Employed 56.96  60.55  63.36 
Unemployed 4.40  3.35  3.75 
Inactive 38.64  36.10  32.89 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
Table 3.9 presents the proportion of employed, unemployed and inactive 
individuals by educational group. In the 1992 to 1997/98 period, data show a 
strong increase in employment rates, jointly with a decrease in inactivity rate, for 
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all educational levels but college complete group. Employment increases and 
inactivity decreases are stronger for higher educational levels. This should imply 
an increase in inequality. In the 1997/98 to 2005 period, employment only keeps 
growing (and inactivity shrinking) for primary education and for complete 
university education. Overall, for this period we should expect an equalizing 
effect on income inequality. Over the whole period the unequalizing effect of the 
first period is expected to be stronger than its compensation in the next period. 
 
3.3.7  Education  
 
In Paraguay, as in many developing countries, substantial changes in the 
educational composition of the population have been taking place during the 
nineties. Table 3.10 presents the proportion of individuals between 12 and 64 
years of age by educational level. Between 1992 and 1997/98 there was a 
contraction in the proportion of youngsters and adults with incomplete primary 
education and an expansion for incomplete secondary education. Both are 
groups with low or up to medium wages. In the 1997/98 to 2005 period the 
participation of incomplete primary education kept falling, primary complete 
remained almost unchanged and larger changes were observed in the higher 
income groups with secondary and college education. 
 
Table 3.10   Composition of Sample by Educational Level in Paraguay, 
Selected Years 
   1992  1997/98  2005 
Primary incomplete  44.43  36.86  27.46 
Primary complete  23.18  25.32  23.05 
Secondary incomplete  12.27  22.64  26.93 
Secondary complete  13.18  8.36  11.00 
College incomplete  4.60  5.40  9.42 
College complete  2.35  1.42  2.14 
Note: Data cover individuals between 12 and 64 with valid answers. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
Education is usually viewed as an equalizing force. The traditional argument 
points out that income disparities in one generation can be reduced in the next, if 
poor children have access to more and better education, so that the educational 
gap with rich-families’ children decreases. However, following Kuznets (1955), 
one can tell a different story if the high-educated rich are a minority and only 
some poor children manage to make it all the way up to the highest educational 
(and income) levels. In that case, it is likely that inequality grows as the average 
education of the population increases; at least until the high education group is 
relatively large. With multiple educational levels, a similar unequalizing 
outcome emerges if there is a net outflow from the lowest educational levels and 
a similar net inflow to the highest levels, with minor changes in the intermediate 
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levels. Changes in the educational structure from 1997/98 to 2005 have more or 
less taken this form, which feeds the assumption of an unequalizing education 
effect for this period and a more equalizing effect for the 1992 to 1997/98 
period. Between 1992 y 1997/98, 5% of working age population left the primary 
education group. Almost all of these entered the secondary education group. In 
the 1997/98 to 2005 period, 12% left primary education. Seven percent entered 
in secondary education but the other 5% passed on to college level. 
 
So far we have analyzed several factors that might have affected inequality. 
Although we have offered some evidence to argue about each effect, we still do 
not have a consistent framework to confirm the sign of each effect and where to 
assess its quantitative relevance. Were changes in the returns to education really 
an unequalizing force? Were they really a significant force? What about gender, 
employment or education effects? The next section presents a framework to 
tackle these issues.  
 
3.4  Estimation strategy  
 
To compute expressions (3.14) and (3.19) in section two, we need to have 
estimates of parameters β and λ and the residual terms e. Also, since we do not 
have panels, we need a mechanism to assign observable and unobservable 
individual characteristics in period t’ to individuals in t. This section is dedicated 
to explain the strategies to deal with these problems.  
 
Estimation of β and λ  
Let Li denote the number of hours worked by person i, and with wi the hourly 
wage perceived. Total labour income is given by Yi = Li.wi. The number of 
hours of work Li comes from a utility maximization process which determines 
optimal participation in the labour market, whereas wages are determined by 
market forces. The estimation stage specifies models for wages and hours of 
work which are used in the simulation stage described above.  
 
The econometric specification of the model is similar to the one used by 
Bourguignon Fournier and Gurgand (2001), which corresponds to the reduced 
form of the labour decisions model originally proposed by Heckman (1974). 
Heckman shows how it is possible to derive an estimable reduced form starting 
from a structural system obtained from a utility maximization problem of labour 
- consumption decisions. Leaving technical details aside, the scheme proposed 
by Heckman has the following structure. Individuals allocate hours to work and 
domestic activities (or leisure) so as to maximize their utility subject to time, 
wealth, wages and other constraints. As usual, the solution to this optimization 
problem can be characterized as demand relations for goods and leisure as 
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functions of the relevant prices. Under general conditions it is possible to invert 
these functions to obtain prices and wages as functions of quantities of goods 
and leisure consumed (or its counterpart, hours of work). In particular, the wages 
obtained in this manner (denoted as w*) are to be interpreted as marginal 
valuations of labour, which will be a function of hours of work and other 
personal characteristics, and represent the minimum wage for which the 
individual would accept to work a determined number of hours. In equilibrium, 
if the individual decides to work, the number of hours devoted to labour should 
equate their marginal value w* with the wage effectively perceived. On the 
contrary, if the individual decides not to work, it is because this marginal value 
is greater than the wage offered, given the individual’s personal characteristics. 
 
This discussion suggests how to determine wages as of which individuals are 
willing to work. On the same note, it is possible to model market determinants of 
wages offered (w) as a function of characteristics such as years of education, 
experience and age as a standard Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974). In 
equilibrium it is assumed that the number of hours of work adjusts to make 
w=w*.  
 
The demand-supply relations discussed so far are structural forms in the sense 
that they reflect relevant economic behaviour in which wages offered and asked 
depend on the number of hours of work, which equate in equilibrium. Under 
general conditions it is possible to derive a reduced form for the equilibrium 
relations, in which wages and hours of work are expressed as functions of the 
variables taken as exogenous. In this way, the model has two equations, one for 
wages (w*) and one for the number of hours of work (L*), both as function of 
factors taken as given which affect wages (X1) and hours (X2) which may or 
may not have elements in common. The error terms e1 and e2 will represent 
non-observable factors affecting the determination of endogenous variables. 
According to the characteristics of the problem, for a particular individual we 
observe positive values of w* and L* if and only if the individual actually works. 
If the person does not work, we only know that the wage offered is less than the 
salary asked. Consequently, the reduced form model for wages and hours of 
work is specified as:  
 
  wi* = X1ib + e1i   i = 1, ..., N       ( 3 . 2 0 )  
  Li* = X2il + e2 i           ( 3 . 2 1 )  
with  
wi = wi* if Li* > 0 
wi = 0 if Li* ￿ 0  
Li = Li* if Li* > 0  
Li = 0 if Li* ￿ 0  
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where wi and Li correspond to observed wages and hours of work, respectively. 
This notation emphasizes that, consistently with the data used for the estimation, 
observed wages for a non-working individual are zero.  
 
Following Heckman (1979), for estimation purposes we will assume that ei1 and 
ei2 have a bivariate normal distribution with E(e1i) = E(e2i) = 0, variances s12 and 
s22 and correlation coefficient r. This particular specification corresponds to the 
“Tobit type III” model in Amemiya’s (1985) classification. 
 
Although it is possible to estimate all the parameters using a full information 
maximum likelihood method, the implemented methodology adopted a limited 
information approach, which has notorious computational advantages. If instead 
of hours of work we only had information about whether the individual works or 
not, the model would correspond to the “Type II” model in Amemiya’s 
classification, whose parameters can be estimated based on a simple selectivity 
model. More specifically, the regression equation would be the wage equation 
and the selection equation would be a censored version of the labour supply 
equation, simply indicating whether the individual works or not. Table 3.3 
shows the estimation results of these equations.  
 
On the other hand, the hours of work equation corresponds to the “Tobit type I” 
model in Amemiya’s classification where the variable is observed only if it is 
positive. In this case, the parameters of interest could be estimated using a 
standard censored regression Tobit model. This strategy is consistent though not 
fully efficient. In any case, the efficiency loss is not necessarily significant for a 
small sample. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 3.7.  
 
Unobservable Factors  
Unobservable characteristics affecting wages are modelled as regression error 
terms of the wage equation (3.20). Their mean is trivially normalized to zero and 
their variance is estimated as an extra parameter in the Heckman procedure. In 
order to simulate the effect of changes in those unobservable factors between t to 
t’  on inequality, the estimated residuals of the wage equation of year t  are 
rescaled by st´/st, where s is the estimated standard deviation of the wage 
equation. This captures the effect of differences between years in dispersion in 
the unobservable factor affecting wages, which include non-observable factors 
and their market value.
10 
                                                 
10  It is important to mention that under bivariate normal assumption implicit in the 
Heckman model, once the correlation between unobservables affecting wages and 
hours worked is kept constant, all remaining effects on unobservables on wages 
come through the variance. Machado and Mata (1998) allow for heterogeneous 
behavior of the error term using quantile regression methods. 
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To study employment effects the decomposition methodology requires 
simulating earnings for people who do not work. Since we do not observe wages 
we cannot apply equations (3.20) and (3.21) to estimate the unobservable 
factors. For each individual in that situation, we assign as “error term” a random 
draw from the bivariate normal distribution implicit in the wage - labour supply 
model (3.20) and (3.21), whose parameters are consistently estimated by the 
Heckman procedure. Residuals are sampled from the distribution of 
unobservable factors but conditional to the fact that the behaviour of the 
individual is observed. That is, error terms are drawn from the bivariate normal 
distribution and a prediction (based on observable characteristics, estimated 
parameters and sampled errors) is computed for wages and hours worked. If the 
resulting prediction yields positive hours worked (so the prediction is 
inconsistent with the observed behaviour in this group), the error term is 
sampled again until non-positive hours of work are predicted.  
 
Individual characteristics  
For the estimation of the education effect it is necessary to simulate the 
educational structure of year t´ on year t population since we do not have the 
same individuals in both years. Instead of following Bourguignon, Fournier and 
Gurgand (2001) and estimating a parametric equation that relates individual 
educational level to other individual characteristics (age and gender), a rough 
non-parametric mechanism was applied. Adult population was divided in ten 
homogeneous groups by gender and age and then the educational structure of a 
given cell in year t’ was replicated into the corresponding cell in year t.  
 
Poverty 
Poverty, measured officially by income, summing all kind of income, decreased 
in Paraguay between 1992 and 1997/98, increased until 2002 and turned back to 
a slight reduction as from 2003. Poverty and inequality are not the same, but 
they are closely related. A higher level of inequality reduces poverty reduction 
driven by economic growth, since the additional income and benefits from 
growth are not equally distributed amongst the population. Inequality reduction 
is not a poverty reduction tool in itself, but it can improve performance and 
impact of poverty reduction processes. So, it would be interesting to figure out 
which could be the effects the simulated inequality changes on poverty levels. 
Since the simulations of changes of inequality are based on labour income, we 
need a labour income poverty line. There is no such line officially fixed for 
Paraguay. As a proxy, the mean equivalent household labour income of all 
households classified as poor by the official per capita income poverty line, was 
taken as an income poverty line to check on poverty reduction effects of 
simulated inequality changes. Since this is only a very rough proxy, 
measurement results should not be taken as real changes in poverty, related to 
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inequality changes, because there are other kinds of income and many more 
factors related to poverty change as a whole. Anyway, the simulated poverty 
changes could be understood as a proxy for the sign of poverty reduction impact 
of an observed change in inequality, and to identify which kind of inequality 
change would have a stronger effect on poverty and which would not. 
 
3.5  Results  
 
This section reports the results of performing the decomposition described in 
Section 2 using the estimation strategy outlined in Section 4. The objective is to 
shed light over the quantitative relevance of the various phenomena discussed in 
Section 3 on inequality changes during the 1992 - 2005 period.  
 
Before showing the results two points must be clarified. First, the 
decompositions are path dependent. Hence, results are reported using 
alternatively t and t’ as the base year. Second, the simulations are carried out for 
the whole distribution. 
 
Tables 3.11 to 3.13 show the results both with t and t´ as base years. Table 3.14 
reports the average of these results. A positive number indicates an unequalizing 
effect. A large number compared to the other figures in the column suggests a 
significant effect. For instance, the returns-to-education effect on the individual 
earnings distribution in the 1992 to 1997/98 period is -2.1. This roughly means 
that the Gini would have decreased -2.1 points, if only the returns to education 
(i.e. the coefficients of the educational dummies in the wage equation) had 
changed between those years. The number -2.1 tells us two things: (i) since it is 
a negative number, it implies that the returns-to-education effect was inequality-
decreasing, and (ii) since it is large compared to the other numbers in the 
column, it indicates that the change in returns to education was economically a 
significant factor affecting inequality. Its effect on equivalent household income 
distribution is also inequality decreasing, but to a minor degree. Nevertheless, 
returns to education seem to have a poverty increasing effect. The story here is 
that changes in return to education are related to income losses, which certainly 
make income distribution more equal. At the same time, however, lower income 
groups suffer stronger losses, so some of them fall below the poverty line. 
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Table 3.11  Decomposition of the Change in Gini coefficient for Earnings 
and Equivalent Household Labour Income and Equivalent 
Labour Household Income Poverty, Paraguay 1992 – 1997/98 
Using 1997/98 coefficients            
   Earnings  Equivalent income  Poverty 
Indicator  Level Change  Level  Change  Level Change 
1992 observed  58.9     60.6     35.4    
1997/98  observed  55.3 -3.6  58.4  -2.2  27.5 -7.9 
Effect                   
Returns  to  education  59.6 0.7  60.2  0.4  37.1 1.7 
Gender wage gap  58.4  -0.5  59.5  -1.1  33.6  -1.8 
Returns to experience  59.7  0.8  61.0  -0.4  34.6  -0.8 
Unobservable factors  61.0  2.1  61.8  1.2  35.1  -0.3 
Hours of work  57.6  -1.3  60.2  -0.4  33.9  -1.5 
Employment  56.4 -2.5  59.5  -1.1  32.3 -3.1 
Education  56.8 -2.1  59.0  -1.6  33.8 -1.6 
Other factors  58.1  -0.8     0.8     -0.5 
Using 1992 coefficients            
   Earnings  Equivalent income  Poverty 
Indicator  Level Change  Level  Change  Level Change 
1992 observed  58.9     60.6     35.4    
1997/98  observed  55.3 -3.6  58.4  -2.2  27.5 -7.9 
Effect                 
Returns  to  education  59.0 0.1  60.7  0.1  36.2 0.8 
Gender wage gap  58.6  -0.3  60.1  -0.5  34.4  -1.0 
Returns to experience  58.4 -0.5  60.4  -0.2  34.4 -1.0 
Unobservable factors  59.7  0.8  61.1  0.5  34.7  -0.7 
Hours of work  58.0  -0.9  60.1  -0.5  33.6  -1.8 
Employment  58.2 -0.7  60.3  -0.3  34.4 -1.0 
Education  57.3 -1.6  59.7  -0.9  34.0 -1.4 
Other factors  58.4  -0.5     -0.4     -1.8 
Average changes 
Indicator  Earnings Equivalent  income  Poverty 
1992 -  1997/98 observed  -3.6 -2.2 -7.9 
Effect          
Returns to education  0.4  -0.1  1.3 
Gender wage gap  -0.4  -0.8  -1.4 
Returns to experience  0.2 0.1 -0.9 
Unobservable factors  1.5  0.8  -0.5 
Hours of work  -1.1  -0.4  -1.7 
Employment -1.6  -0.7  -2.1 
Education -1.9  -1.3  -1.5 
Other factors  -0.7  0.2  -1.2 
Note:    The earnings distribution includes those individuals with Yit > 0 and Yit(kt’) > 0. The 
equivalent household labour income distribution includes those individuals with Y
q
it >= 0 and 
Y
q
it(kt’) >= 0. Non-labour income is not considered. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
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Table 3.12  Decomposition of the Change in Gini coefficient for Earnings  
and Equivalent Household Labour Income and Equivalent 
Labour Household Income Poverty, Paraguay 1997/98 – 2005 
Using 2005 coefficients 
   Earnings  Equivalent income  Poverty 
Indicator  Level Change  Level  Change  Level Change 
1997/98 observed  55.3     58.4     27.5    
2005 observed  49.0  -6.3  52.8  -5.6  32.6  5.1 
Effect                   
Returns to education  52.6  -2.7  57.2  -1.2  29.3  1.8 
Gender wage gap  55.2  -0.1  58.1  -0.3  27.1  -0.4 
Returns to experience  53.9  -1.4  57.6  -0.8  27.7  0.2 
Unobservable factors  53.2  -2.1  56.6  -1.8  28.7  1.2 
Hours of work  54.3  -1.0  58.0  -0.4  27.8  0.3 
Employment 55.4  0.1  57.7  -0.7  28.1  0.6 
Education  54.8 -0.5  58.4  0.0  27.3 -0.2 
Other factors     1.4     -0.4     1.6 
Using 1997/98 coefficients            
   Earnings  Equivalent income  Poverty 
Indicator  Level Change  Level  Change  Level Change 
1997/98 observed  55.3     58.4     27.5    
2005 observed  49.0  -6.3  52.8  -5.6  32.6  5.1 
Effect                   
Returns to education  53.1  -2.2  56.6  -1.8  28.9  1.4 
Gender wage gap  55.0  -0.3  57.8  -0.6  27.3  -0.2 
Returns to experience  54.8 -0.5  58.1  -0.3  28.5 1.0 
Unobservable factors  53.9  -1.4  57.3  -1.1  28.5  1.0 
Hours of work  53.4  -1.9  57.4  -1.0  28.2  0.7 
Employment 55.6  0.3  58.1  -0.3  28.3  0.8 
Education 55.5  0.2  58.8  0.4  28.2  0.7 
Other factors     -0.5     -0.9     -0.3 
Average changes 
Indicator  Earnings Equivalent  income  Poverty 
1997/98 – 2005 observed  -6.3  -5.6  5.1 
Effect          
Returns to education  -2.5  -1.5  1.6 
Gender wage gap  -0.2  -0.4  -0.3 
Returns to experience  -1.0 -0.5 0.6 
Unobservable factors  -1.8  -1.4  1.1 
Hours of work  -1.5  -0.7  0.5 
Employment  0.2 -0.5 0.7 
Education -0.1  0.2  0.3 
Other  factors  0.5 -0.7 0.7 
Note:    The earnings distribution includes those individuals with Yit > 0 and Yit(kt’) > 0. The 
equivalent household labour income distribution includes those individuals with Y
q
it >= 0 and 
Y
q
it(kt’) >= 0. Non-labour income is not considered. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
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Table 3.13  Decomposition of the Change in Gini coefficient for Earnings 
and Equivalent Household Labour Income and Equivalent 
Labour Household Income Poverty, Paraguay 1992 – 2005 
Using 2005 coefficients 
   Earnings  Equivalent income  Poverty 
Indicator  Level Change  Level  Change  Level  Change 
1992 observed  58.9     60.6     35.4    
2005 observed  49.0  -9.9  52.8  -7.8  32.6  -2.8 
Effect                   
Returns to education  56.9  -2.0  59.0  -1.6  38.9  3.5 
Gender wage gap  58.3  -0.6  59.2  -1.4  33.2  -2.2 
Returns to experience  58.3  -0.6  60.2  -0.4  34.8  -0.6 
Unobservable factors  58.9  0.0  60.0  -0.6  36.3  0.9 
Hours of work  56.6  -2.3  59.8  -0.8  34.2  -1.2 
Employment 56.5  -2.4  58.8  -1.8  32.9  -2.5 
Education 56.3  -2.6  59.0  -1.6  33.6  -1.8 
Other factors     0.6     0.4     1.1 
Using 1992 coefficients            
   Earnings  Equivalent income  Poverty 
Indicator  Level  Change  Level  Change   Level  Change  
1992 observed  58.9     60.6     35.4    
2005 observed  49.0  -9.9  52.8  -7.8  32.6  -2.8 
Effect                   
Returns to education  56.8  -2.1  58.9  -1.7  37.6  2.2 
Gender wage gap  58.3  -0.6  59.5  -1.1  34.2  -1.2 
Returns to experience  57.9 -1.0  60.1  -0.5  35.4  0.0 
Unobservable factors  58.3  -0.6  60.0  -0.6  35.7  0.3 
Hours of work  56.1  -2.8  59.1  -1.5  34.3  -1.1 
Employment 58.5  -0.4  60.0  -0.6  35.2  -0.2 
Education 57.5  -1.4  60.1  -0.5  34.7  -0.7 
Other factors     -1.0     -1.3     -2.1 
Average changes 
Indicator  Earnings Equivalent  income  Poverty 
1992 -  2005 observed  -9.9 -7.8  -2.8 
Effect          
Returns to education  -2.1  -1.7  2.9 
Gender wage gap  -0.6  -1.3  -1.7 
Returns to experience  -0.8 -0.5  -0.3 
Unobservable factors  -0.3  -0.6  0.6 
Hours of work  -2.6  -1.2  -1.2 
Employment -1.4  -1.2  -1.4 
Education -2.0  -1.1  -1.2 
Other factors  -0.2  -0.5  -0.5 
Note:    The earnings distribution includes those individuals with Yit > 0 and Yit(kt’) > 0. The 
equivalent household labour income distribution includes those individuals with Y
q
it >= 0 and 
Y
q
it(kt’) >= 0. Non-labour income is not considered. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
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Table 3.14  Decomposition of the Change in the Gini Coefficient and 
Equivalent Household Income Poverty Rates Changing the 
Base Year, Paraguay, Selected Periods 
Note:    The earnings distribution includes those individuals with Yit  > 0 and Yit(kt’) > 0. The 
equivalent household labour income distribution includes those individuals with Y
q
it >= 0 and 
Y
q
it(kt’) >= 0. Non-labour income is not considered. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH and EIH of National University and DGEEC. 
 
Returns to education  
Table 3.14 confirms the assumption of Section 3. Changes in the returns to 
education had an unequalizing effect on the individual earnings distribution 
between 1992 and 1997/98 and a strong equalizing effect in the next seven 
years. The effects on the equivalent income distribution were similar. Over the 
whole period 1992-2005, changes in the returns to education (in terms of hourly 
wages) represented an important inequality-decreasing factor.  
 
Gender wage gap  
As expected, changes in the gender parameter of the wage equation implied an 
equalizing effect on the individual earnings distribution. During the last decade 
the gender gap has substantially reduced in size. Given that women earn less 
than men, that movement had an unambiguous inequality - decreasing effect on 
the earnings distribution. It is interesting to notice that the gender effect becomes 
more important in the equivalent household labour income distribution. Two 
factors combine to generate this result. First, female workers are more 
concentrated in the lower part of the distribution than men (mainly in rural area) 
and therefore a relative wage change implies a decrease in household income 
inequality. Second, a proportional wage increase for all females is more relevant 
in low-income families since women’s earnings are a more significant part of the 
  Earnings Equivalent  household  income Poverty 











1992 -  
2005 







Observed -3.6  -6.3 -9.9 -2.2  -5.6  -7.8 -7.9  5.1 -2.8 
Effect             
Returns to 
education  0.4  -2.5 -2.1 -0.1  -1.5  -1.7  1.3  1.6  2.9 
Gender wage 
gap  -0.4  -0.2 -0.6 -0.8  -0.4  -1.2 -1.4  -0.3 -1.7 
Returns to 
experience  0.2  -0.9  -0.7 0.1  -0.5 -0.4 -0.9  0.6 -0.3 
Unobservable 
factors  1.5  -1.8  -0.3 0.8  -1.4 -0.6 -0.5  1.1 0.6 
Hours of 
work  -1.1  -1.5 -2.6 -0.4  -0.7  -1.2 -1.7  0.5 -1.2 
Employment -1.5  0.2 -1.3 -0.7  -0.5 -1.2 -2.1  0.7 -1.4 
Education -1.9  -0.1 -2.0 -1.3  0.2  -1.1 -1.5  0.3 -1.2 
Other factors  -0.8  0.5 -0.3 0.3  -0.8 -0.5 -1.1  0.6 -0.5 
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total resources in those households than in rich families. A great example is the 
disproportionate number of poor households headed by working women. 
Consequently, its effect on poverty is a reduction. 
 
Returns to experience  
Changes in the returns to experience (age) implied an unequalizing effect on the 
earnings distribution during the period 1992-1997/98 and an equalizing effect in 
the next seven years. A brief explanation follows. The effects of changes in the 
returns to experience did not have direction and impact for all education levels. 
There was a clear equalizing effect for low education levels, unclear effects for 
medium education levels and an inequalizing effect for high educational levels. 
The empirical evidence shows that the increase of inequality in higher education 
levels outpaced equalizing effects for lower levels. Nevertheless, the equalizing 
effects for lower education levels do exist and are associated to higher incomes, 
so that poverty tends to reduce. Between 1997/98 and 2005 there is a more 
generalized equalizing effect, however, associated with income losses. So 
inequality decreased meanwhile poverty increased. Results for equivalent 
household income show the same patterns. 
 
Unobservable Factors  
Changes in endowments and returns to unobservable factors have implied 
unequalizing changes in wages in the 1992 – 1997/98 period, associated with 
poverty reduction and opposite effects over the next seven years, for both, 
earnings and equivalent household income.  
 
Hours of Work 
We carried out three simulations to assess the relevance of employment changes 
on inequality. In all of these the distribution in the base year is simulated using 
the parameters of the Tobit employment equation of the other year. In the 
employment and participation effects, people with non-positive simulated hours 
of work are assigned zero earnings, so they remain included in the data set. 
People who work in the simulation are assigned the actual base year wage and 
the simulated worked hours in the employment  effect and the actual worked 
hours in the participation effect. The third simulation is intended to single out 
the impact of changes in hours worked. People who change labour status (i.e. we 
kept their current earnings) and change hours of work to individuals who work 
both in the base year and in the simulation, were ignored.  
 
An equalizing employment effect shows up in the individual earnings and 
equivalent household income distribution for the whole period. Nevertheless, in 
the first period it is associated with poverty reduction (income increase for lower 
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earnings) and with a poverty increase in the second period. Notice that since we 
exclude those individuals with zero earnings from that distribution, the 
employment effect is basically the result of relative changes in the number of 
hours of work. The figures for the hours-of-work and participation effects 
confirm this assertion. As discussed in Section 3, the nineties witnessed a 
substantial increase in hours of work in general.  
 
Employment  
Labour participation grew fast after 1992, a period of economic growth and 
creation of new and additional labour opportunities. Consequently, inequality 
and poverty decreased during the first period, for earnings and equivalent 
household income. Part of these gains were lost after 1998, when the economy 
entered a period of recession. Middle classes rank first regarding income losses, 
so inequality and poverty increased after 1998, for both, earnings and equivalent 
household income. Nevertheless, losses of the second period were not as strong 




Paraguay has witnessed important changes in the educational composition of its 
population since the implementation of educational reform was started in 1994. 
An inequality and poverty reduction for earnings and households, together with 
poverty reduction was the result for the first period. In the second period 
earnings distribution keeps getting better for labour income, but equivalent 
household income distribution unequalizes and poverty increases. This might be 
the result of the increase in workers with university level education at the same 
time as income losses for primary education. 
 
Other factors and Interactions  
The last row in Table 3.14 is calculated as a residual. It encompasses the effects 
of interaction terms and many factors not considered in the analysis. According 
to Table 3.14, in general, this term is lower than the mean of the other terms in 
the decomposition, implying either that the factors not considered in the analysis 
are not extremely important or that they tend to compensate each other.  
 
3.6  Discussion 
 
The results of the paper suggest that the smaller change in inequality between 
1992 and 1997/98 is mainly the result of employment (including hours of work) 
and education effects, characterized by a primary schooling expansion. The 
stronger inequality reduction effect after 1997 is due to returns to education, 
hours of work (since unemployment increased) and unobservable factors. Maybe 
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the most interesting finding of the paper is, that the general trend of an 
inequality decrease (interrupted by the 2000 – 2002 economic crises) held over 
the observation period, finding a way to reduce inequality even during periods of 
poverty increase. Comparing the post-2002 period with 1997/98, we can see that 
in 2005, even if poverty was higher, inequality was lower. As shown above, 
labour market conditions in a mix-up of participation rates, unemployment, 
hours of work and returns to education are the mechanisms which helped to 
decrease inequality, as well as unobservable factors in the 1997/98 to 2005 
period, however, poverty increased at the same time. Labour income in 2005, in 
general, was lower than in 1992 and income was lost over the whole distribution 
and, in a higher level for higher income groups, this is why inequality decreased. 
However, since income also decreased for the poor, some former non-poor 
workers of households fell below the poverty line, and are now what are known 
as “new-poor” households. Good inequality reduction policies should search the 
opposite output, inequality and poverty reduction at the same time. 
 
One of the surprising findings of this paper is the extremely high returns to 
education in 1997/98. Education reform started in 1994 with primary education, 
so education reform results could not yet have had impact labour market in 
1997/98. However, the decrease of returns to education after 1998 can be 
observed in relation to education reform, at least for secondary education. As 
labour force increases its human capital at a massive rate, returns to education 
tend to decrease. We checked for returns to education in 1999 and 2000/01 
surveys. In both cases, returns to education are surprisingly high, although 
slightly lower than 1997/98 results. Consequently, there seems to be no 
measurement error. Returns to education fall sharply in 2002, just at the time of 
a deepening in the economic crisis. Thus, decreasing returns to education seem 
to be a mix of lower remuneration levels in all the economy and the results of 
education reform. 
 
Changes of inequality at the equivalent household income level are difficult to 
understand. Nevertheless, they are included in this paper just to show that even 
if inequality changes related, for instance to labour participation, could be 
important at an individual level, their impact at the household level does not 
necessarily have to be the same. Interestingly, gender wage gap reductions have 
a strong poverty reduction impact at a household level. The chain of effects 
seems to be that the additional income for women, leaving everything else 
constant, also benefits female headed households, most of which live below the 
poverty line. 
 
The same factor which explained inequality changes, employment, hours of 
work and education factors have the main impact on changes on income poverty 
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levels, as should be expected. Once more, the signs and the “rank” of these 
poverty estimates should be considered and not necessarily the magnitude of 
simulated changes in poverty, since their estimation method was not very 
sophisticated. 
 
3.7  Conclusions 
 
The decomposition methodology used in this paper can describe more 
completely the reasons for changes in aggregate income inequality within 
particular economies. A country may experience relatively little change in the 
overall level of income inequality despite significant changes in the composition 
of that inequality. Analyzing several countries during the same period of time, 
using this kind of inequality decomposition will produce more detailed results 
than cross country comparisons and might show how despite similar economic 
crisis and common trends in a given region and period of time, overall levels of 
and changes in income inequality remain distinct by country (Bourguignon, 
Ferreira, Lustig, 2005). Dion (2007) concludes from their comparison of several 
countries show that it seems likely that differences in inequality outcomes may 
reflect differences not only in endowments, prices and occupation effects, but 
also in policy decisions and priorities of different governments.  
 
This paper contributes to an upcoming political discussion in Paraguayan 
development politics, which are starting to shift their focus somewhat away from 
poverty reduction politics towards inequality reduction politics, now 
understanding poverty in part, as a consequence of inequality. This contribution 
is appreciated by showing the results of a microeconometric decompositions 
methodology. This technique allows the assessment of the relevance of various 
factors that affected inequality during a period of 13 years, between 1992 and 
2005.  
 
This paper is not on Paraguayan poverty or inequality reduction politics. 
Nevertheless, some concluding comments on these can help to better understand 
the acquired results. The story we can tell, knowing Paraguayan politics, is that 
the impacts of market forces and business cycles have a stronger impact on 
Paraguayan inequality and poverty, than special policies do. This is, on the one 
hand, because there are very few of such policies and, on the other hand, most of 
these lack scale, so even if the political concept is adequate, impact cannot be 
created for problems of scale. Educational politics is one of the exceptions. 
 
There are also structural problems in Paraguayan economy, with an informal 
sector of about 50% of the labour force, so any initiative taken by the 
government, for instance on legal minimum wage, will not have any impact on 
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half of the labour force. These kinds of problems are strongly limiting 
possibilities for policies impact; just an example to better understand the 
importance of these kinds of phenomenon. In 2005, only 10% of the labour force 
had a labour income equal or above the legal minimum wage.  
 
Consequently, if regional market forces and business cycles tell almost the 
whole story of inequality and poverty changes, we should better understand how 
this works. Labour income in Paraguay is much more than monetary income. It 
includes monetarized values for self consumption of agricultural products 
cultivated by farmers. In 1997, agricultural GDP growth was 2.2 times bigger 
than overall GDP growth. More than 35% of the labour force works in the 
agricultural sector. Cultivating land is almost the same amount of work (in 
hours) year after year, but if the harvest is good and prices are even better, for a 
small period of years, the returns to education (even for low educated small 
farmers) will be high for these years. Returns to education level benefit from an 
open economy in “good times”, but in “bad times” external shocks such as the 
Brazilian devaluation and the Argentine default strike even harder. 
 
Thus, if social politics are necessary to reduce inequality, but economic and 
market forces are stronger in their negative impacts than positive impacts that 
could be generated by social politics, maybe protection mechanisms for 
vulnerable groups would be the necessary complement to social politics and 
research should focus on these issues. 
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A - Annex to Chapter 1 
Figure A1   Structured error per capita income estimates 1992  
at district level 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECV 1992 and CNPV 1992 
Figure A2   Unstructured error per capita income estimates 1992  
at district level 
 




















Figure A3   Structured error per capita income estimates 2002  
at district level 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EPH 2002 and CNPV 2002 
Figure A4   Unstructured error per capita income estimates 2002 
at district level 
 


















Figure A5   Relative change in FGT0 per capita income – period 1992 – 
2002 at district level 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on ECV 1992, CNPV 1992, EPH 2002 and CNPV 2002 
Figure A6   Relative change in Gini per capita income – period 1992 – 2002 
at district level 




















B – Annex to Chapter 2 





















Estimated growth for all households in Census Estimated growth for households grouped in panels
Estimated growth for common panels in 1992 and 2002
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